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Eric T. Olson
To appear in J. Keller, ed., Being, Freedom, and Method: Themes from van
Inwagen, OUP.
The so-called constituent ontology says that the properties of a concrete particular
are constituents of it:  parts, or something like parts.  This is supposed to account for
its character.  I argue that the constituent ontology cannot account for things瀞
character, and entails the existence of immaterial minds and of objects with an
impossible character.  One could avoid some of the problems by denying that
constituency is like parthood, but this amounts to rejecting the constituent ontology.
According to the so-called constituent ontology, concrete particulars are made
up of things other than concrete particulars.  Dogs are made up of atoms.  But the
constituent ontology says that dogs also have parts that are nothing like atoms--so
unlike them as not to be concrete particulars at all.
The claim is not that dogs are made up partly of atoms and partly of these other
things, in the way that my desk is made up partly of metal pieces and partly of
wooden ones.  A dog is made up entirely of atoms.  Take away the atoms and
nothing is left.  But it is also made up entirely of things that are neither atoms nor
concrete particulars of any other sort, so that taking away those things (whatever
that might amount to) would leave nothing.  The atoms and the other things occupy
different levels of composition.  On one level, a dog is made up of atoms, but on
another level--a metaphysically deeper one--it is made up of the other things.
The concrete particulars making up a dog and the way they relate to one
another are sometimes called its mereological structure.  The things other than
concrete particulars making up a dog are called its constituents, and they and the
way they relate to one another are its logical or ontological structure.
The principal constituents of things, on the constituent ontology, are properties.
These might be shareable universals, so that the same property of being human is
a constituent of both you and me; or they might be nonshareable 惇tropes敦, such as
my very own humanity:  a thing numerically different from yours, though perhaps
exactly like it.
No one, to my knowledge, thinks that concrete particulars are made up of both
tropes and universals, or that some are made of tropes and others of universals.
But some say that they are made up of tropes or universals together with another
constituent--just one--that is not a property at all but rather a special sort of
particular:  惇the particular in abstraction from its properties敦 (Armstrong 1997: 123)
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or 惇thin particular敦 or 惇substratum敦.  It does not itself have properties as constituents.
It bears or supports properties, but does not exemplify them.  The properties 惇inhere
in敦 without characterizing it, like feathers stuck into clay.  It is only because of their
inhering in a common substratum, the idea goes, that they are exemplified by a
single concrete particular--though that concrete particular is not the substratum
itself but something made up of the substratum and the properties.  (There is
dispute about whether a substratum could exist without supporting any properties,
as a 惇bare particular敦.)
That makes four species of constituent ontology:  that concrete particulars are
made up of universals, of tropes, of universals and a substratum, or of tropes and a
substratum.
The constituent ontology is not the view that properties are parts of certain
abstract objects:  facts or states of affairs or propositions, say.1  Perhaps what
makes it true that the Eiger is steep is the existence of a fact composed of that
mountain and the property of steepness.  Or maybe the proposition that the Eiger is
steep has those things as parts.  But such an entity would not be visible or
climbable or made of ice-covered limestone.  I am talking about the view that
steepness is a part of the Eiger itself--that large, cold, dangerous physical object.
So the constituent ontology says that concrete particulars are made up of
properties (and perhaps substrata) in the way that they are made up of atoms, only
on a more fundamental level.  The alternative is that concrete particulars are made
up only of concrete particulars.  A dog is made up of atoms, and at a physically
deeper level it is made up of elementary particles.  It is not in any sense made up of
properties, or these together with a substratum.  There are no substrata at all.
There may be properties, but they are never parts, or anything like parts, of
concrete particulars.  Concrete particulars simply have no ontological structure.
(Armstrong says they would be mere 惇blobs敦.)  This is sometimes called the
relational ontology (Loux 2006: 208), the idea being that properties are removed
from the particulars exemplifying them, and bear to them only an abstract and
bloodless relation utterly unlike that of part to whole.  Because someone could
reject the constituent ontology by denying the existence of properties altogether,
酉relational ontology瀞 is not the best name for this view.  But good or bad, that瀞s the
name it has.
Constituent and relational ontologies are not just two competing views, but
radically different ways of thinking about the metaphysics of concrete objects.
Relationalists are concerned with the way material things relate to their parts--their
concrete, particular parts, that is.  They think about what changes of parts a thing
can survive, if any--think of the ship of Theseus, the puzzle of Dion and Theon (or
1Some object to my claim that states of affairs are abstract (Armstrong 1997; see
also Wolterstorff 1970: 111, though this is not his view).  They say that ordinary
concrete objects such as mountains are states of affairs.  This is not a substantive
disagreement, but merely a different use of the technical term 酉state of affairs瀞.
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amputation paradox), and the problem of increase (or growing paradox).  They ask
whether the same parts can compose two different, 惇coinciding敦 objects at once,
and when smaller concrete particulars compose a larger one.2  For the most part,
constituent ontologists ignore these questions and ask entirely unrelated ones:
whether concrete particulars conform to the identity of indiscernibles, what it is for
several properties to belong to the same thing, whether there is 惇more to敦 a
particular than its properties, and how to avoid Bradley瀞s regress, for instance3--
questions of no interest to most relationalists.  The result is separate debates about
the metaphysics of concrete objects with little common ground.  This can be
frustrating, because participants in these debates often presuppose a constituent or
a relational ontology without saying so, leaving readers to guess, on the basis of
the moves they make, which rules they瀞re playing by.
I cannot hide the fact that I was brought up as a relationalist.  The idea that such
things as dogs have their properties as parts has always seemed to me deeply
confused--like the view, attractive to certain undergraduates, that dogs are
properties.  But I won瀞t make that point here (see van Inwagen 2011).  Let us
suppose, if we can, that the constituent ontology is coherent and intelligible.  I want
to explore problems that it seems nevertheless to face--problems for the most part
very different from the ones constituent ontologists typically worry about.  It may be
that the problems are only apparent and the appearance is based on a
misunderstanding.  In that case I hope someone will be able to clear things up.  Or
maybe the problems are real but solvable.  In any event, I hope to say something
useful to both sides.
Let me try to state the basic principles of the constituent ontology.  It may help to
start by asking how anyone could be led to suppose that ordinary things had
properties as parts.  The usual answer is that it would tell us what it is for a thing to
have a nature or character (Loux 2006: 207, Wolterstorff 1970: 112).  What is it, for
instance, for the book on my desk to be red?  More precisely, what does its being
red consist in?  What accounts for or explains it?  What is its metaphysical ground?
The question is not only about being red:  we could just as well ask what it is for the
book to be rectangular or solid or interesting.  What accounts for any concrete
particular瀞s being any way?
Constituent ontologists answer that a thing has a character by having or
exemplifying properties.  It may be too simple to say that a thing is red by having the
3Rea 1997 consists of debates among relationalists.  Some typical constituentist
papers are collected in the second half of Loux 1976; Simons 1994 gives a useful
history of the view.
2On the amputaton paradox, see van Inwagen 1981; on the problem of increase
see Olson 2006; on coinciding objects see Baker 2000, and on composition
generally see van Inwagen 1990.
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property of redness.  There might be no such property, but only a lot of precise
wavelengths, and mixtures of different wavelengths, that make light red to human
beings.  But the book瀞s being the way it is consists in its having some properties or
other.  This consisting in or grounding is asymmetric:  a thing瀞s properties account
for its character and not vice versa.  So
1.  Concrete particulars have their character because they have the properties they
have.4
In fact this looks like the only way of saying what accounts for a thing瀞s character.
What could account for a thing瀞s character if not its properties?
If a thing瀞s character consists in its having properties, then things with the same
properties will have the same character.  If things could have a different character
but the same properties, their properties would not entirely account for their
character, contrary to 1.  So
2.  Concrete particulars with the same properties have the same character.
(If the properties in question are tropes, their sameness will be exact resemblance.)
Constituent ontologists may also accept the converse principle:
2*.  Concrete particulars with the same character have the same properties.
That is, when concrete particulars are exactly the same, this sameness consists in
their sharing all their properties.  If those properties are universals, this would
explain qualitative sameness in terms of numerical sameness.  It瀞s not clear
whether constituent ontologists have to say this.  Maybe different ontological
structures could produce the same character, in something like the way that
different combinations of wavelengths can produce the same color or different
neural properties can give rise to the same mental property.  There might be
惇multiple realizability敦 of character by properties, so that a thing瀞s properties fix its
character but not vice versa.
If a thing瀞s character consists in its properties, then just as things with all the
same properties will have exactly the same character, things sharing some
properties will have a similar character:
3.  Concrete particulars that share properties are alike in some respect.
If the book and the chair share the property of being red, that makes them alike in
color.
Here the converse principle is far more doubtful:
4Relations may come into the story as well; see §5.
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3*.  Concrete particulars that are alike in some respect share properties.5
Even if things瀞 properties fix their character, the book might be red by virtue of
having one property while the chair is red by having another.  Or there might be
concrete particulars so different that they share no properties at all, yet still alike in
some respect:  in being concrete particulars, for instance.
And some aspects of a thing瀞s character may consist not in its having certain
properties, but in its not having them.  However different you and I may be, we are
alike in not being prime numbers.  If this consisted in our sharing the property of not
being a prime number, it would make that property a common constituent of all
objects apart from prime numbers.  And if a thing瀞s being distinct from the number
42 consisted in its having the property of not being 42, then every entity would be
made up of as many properties as there are numbers.  Constituent ontologists
generally deny that there are any such properties as not being a prime number or
not being the number 42.  They say that only an elite minority of predicates
correspond to properties.6  A thing瀞s not being a prime number will presumably
consist in its lacking properties.  So our being alike in this respect cannot consist in
our sharing properties.
Suppose all this is right:  concrete particulars have their character because of
the properties they have (or lack).  How does this suggest that particulars are made
up of properties?  Well, if things have their character because of the properties they
have--if their character depends on their properties--then the relation between a
thing and its properties must be close and intimate.  This intimacy is not a sort of
inseparability, since it applies to properties accidental to a thing as well as those
essential to it.  We can get some idea of what it is by contrasting it with the
Platonistic view that properties are abstract objects not in space and time.  This
makes the relation between a concrete particular and its properties as abstract and
bloodless as the relation between the Martian moons and the number two (van
Inwagen 2011: 392).  It may be that a thing is red, necessarily, if and only if it relates
in a certain way to a timeless object in Plato瀞s heaven, just as the Martian moons
are two, necessarily, if and only if they relate in a certain way to the number two.
But the character of a thing cannot be grounded in that way.  The book may
exemplify a Platonic universal because it is red, but it cannot be red because it
exemplifies a Platonic universal.  The book瀞s bearing a Platonic universal can no
more account for its being red than the truth of the proposition that grass is green
6This is another deep difference between the two schools.  Relationalists typically
see no reason to suppose that properties are 惇sparse敦:  see e.g. van Inwagen 2004.
The connection between properties瀞 being parts of ordinary objects and their being
sparse is an underexplored topic.
5Though Armstrong appears to accept it, under the slogan 酉resemblance is partial
identity瀞 (1989: 15).
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could explain why grass is green (van Inwagen 2011: 398).
If a thing is red because it exemplifies the property of being red and not vice
versa, then the property must somehow be, as the constituent ontologists say, in the
thing.  It must be 惇down here敦 where the red things are, not up in Plato瀞s heaven
with the numbers and the propositions.  This relation has to be something more
than mere spatial coincidence:  even if the book coincided with a portion of a
magnetic field, that would not make it magnetic.  The book瀞s properties, or at least
its intrinsic properties, must be somehow built into its structure.  (Armstrong
compares them to layers in a cake.)
But what is it for a property to be in something?  What is this close and intimate
relation between things and their properties, and how does it differ from the one
that features in the relational ontology?  This is a notoriously hard question.  The
proposed answer is that a thing瀞s properties are constituents of it--that is, parts.
They are of course not the same sort of parts as atoms.  Maybe a thing瀞s properties
and its atoms stand in different parthood relations to it.  Or maybe they stand in the
same parthood relation and the difference is simply that between properties and
atoms.  But a thing瀞s properties are parts of it in some sense or other.  Not just any
part of a thing, or even any part that is a property, is a constituent of it.  I have
electrons as parts, and each electron has as a constituent the property of having a
mass of approximately 9.11 x 10-31kg.  Since the parts of my parts are also my
parts, this property too must be a part of me.  But not a constituent, as I don瀞t
exemplify it:  my mass (take my word for it) is far greater.7  So we can say at least
this:
4.  A concrete particular has a property iff (and because) the property is a
constituent of it.
5.  x is a constituent of y iff x is a part of y and x is in y.
Assuming that every concrete particular has some character or other, and that
no concrete particular can have a character by having no properties at all, it follows
from these principles that all concrete particulars have properties among their parts.
These are the basic principles of the constituent ontology.  Relationalists, by
contrast, may accept 2 and 3, but not 1, 4, and 5.  They may say that for a thing to
have a certain character is for it to exemplify certain properties, but not that the
second fact grounds or explains or otherwise accounts for the first.
The constituent ontology says that properties are constituents of concrete
particulars, and I have taken constituency to be a sort of parthood.  What could it
mean to say that dogs are bundles of properties if this did not imply that properties
7As Chad Carmichael has pointed out to me, it follows that my skin color is in me
but the masses of my electrons are not, reminding us that 酉in瀞 is a technical term.
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were parts of dogs?  (It can hardly mean that dogs are sets, in the mathematical
sense, having properties as members.)  Constituent ontologists say that concrete
particulars are composed of properties (and perhaps substrata), and composition is
defined in terms of parthood:  the xs compose y =df each of the xs is a part of y, and
every part of y shares a part with at least one of the xs.8  And constituency appears
to share these characteristic features of parthood9:
Inheritance of intrinsicness:  If being F is intrinsic, then having a part (constituent)
that is F is also intrinsic.
Inheritance of location:  If x is a part (constituent) of y, then y is located where x is.
Transitivity:  If x is a part (constituent) of y and y is a part (constituent) of z, then x is
a part (constituent) of z.
Weak supplementation:  If x is a part (constituent) of y and x甫y, then y has a part
(constituent) that does not overlap (i.e., share a part [constituent] with) x.
Strong supplementation:  If y is not a part (constituent) of x, then y has a part
(constituent) that does not overlap x.
Dependence of whole on part:  If all the parts (constituents) of a thing did not exist
and other things were equal, then that thing would not exist either.
If constituency is not a sort of parthood, we can only wonder what it might be.
But perhaps a thing瀞s constituents are not parts but only something like them,
and constitutive composition cannot be defined in terms of parthood.
Someone might say this on the grounds that constitutive composition violates
some of the principles of classical mereology (Armstrong 1989: 91f.).  One such
principle is that composition is universal and unrestricted:  any things whatever
compose something.  But not just any things are constituents of something:  nothing
has as constituents both the property of being human and that of being an electron.
Classical mereology also says that composition is unique--things can compose
only one object--whereas some constituent ontologists say that things can
constitutively compose two different objects at once (see §5).
But this is a poor reason to deny that constituents are parts.  Many non-
constituentists reject the uniqueness of composition, and even more reject
universal composition.  They deny that there is any sense of 酉part瀞 in which things
must always be parts of something bigger.  The mere existence of my left foot and
the planet Mars does not compel us to accept that there is also something
composed of those two objects--a large material thing with two parts a hundred
million miles apart.  Whether these philosophers are right to reject the principles is
of course disputed.  But if the very idea of parthood presupposed them, this
9The first two are from Sider (2007: 70); the third to the fifth are fairly
uncontroversial principles of classical mereology.
8Most definitions also specify that no two of the xs share a part.  Omitting this clause
enables some of the points in §§7 and 10 to be made more simply.
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rejection would amount to denying that there are any parts.  Yet these philosophers
don瀞t deny that there are parts.  They are talking about the same parthood and
composition that classical mereologists speak of.  They simply disagree with them
about the truth of certain metaphysical principles concerning parts, namely the
universality and uniqueness of composition.  Even if those principles are true, they
don瀞t appear to be true by the definition of 酉part瀞.  Constitutive composition need not
conform to them in order to count as a parthood relation.10
A better thought is that parts must be independent of wholes.  The atoms
composing a dog can exist without being parts of that animal or any other ordinary
object.  By contrast, constituent ontologists typically say that things瀞 constituents
depend for their existence on those things:  a universal cannot exist without being a
constituent of something, and a trope cannot exist without being a constituent of the
particular thing it is in.  Whether this is a good reason to deny that constituency is
parthood depends on whether a thing瀞s parts, just by being parts, must be able to
exist independently--that is, without being parts.  Aristotelian hylomorphists say no:
they deny that a dog瀞s heart can exist without the dog, but not (usually) that it is a
part of the dog.  They say only that hearts are not substances.
Or one might say that constituency cannot be parthood because parthood is
reflexive:  everything is a part of itself, but not everything is a constituent of itself.
Otherwise every property would exemplify itself:  the property of being red, being a
constituent of itself, would be red, just as my book is.  But although the reflexivity of
parthood simplifies mereology (much as the principle that every set is a subset of
itself simplifies set theory), it may be negotiable.
I will return to this theme in §11.  Until then I will take constituents to be parts.
   
Let me now examine the constituent ontology more critically.  Its main virtue is
supposed to be that it tells us what it is for a concrete particular to have a character.
11  This presupposes that there is something that a concrete particular瀞s having a
character consists in:  a metaphysical ground or explanation.  There has to be an
illuminating and nontrivial answer to the question of what it is for a thing to be F, an
answer having the same form for all values of 酉F瀞.  Why accept this?  Why couldn瀞t a
thing瀞s having a character be a brute and unanalyzable fact, with no deeper
metaphysical ground?  The constituent ontology is proposed as an answer--indeed
the only possible answer--to a certain metaphysical question.  But why suppose
that the question has any answer?
10Another assumption of classical mereology disputed by both relational and
constituent ontologists is that parthood is timeless:  things have their parts without
temporal qualification.  For more on classical mereology and its discontents, see
Simons 1987.
11Paul (2002) claims othe virtu s for her own constituent ontology, which differs in
many ways from 惇traditional敦 versions.  I won瀞t discuss her view.
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The likely reply is that the constituent ontology would be a good answer if it
were true.  If a good answer to a question is available, that makes it reasonable to
suppose that the question has an answer.  But I doubt whether the constituent
ontology is a good answer.
For one thing, it doesn瀞t tell us what it is for things in general to have a character.
It does not enable us to complete the schema
x is F iff....
The property of being red has a character.  It瀞s a property, specifically a color.  Its
being a color is as much an aspect of its character as being red is an aspect of the
book瀞s character.  But the constituent ontology says nothing about what it is for red
to be a color.  All it could say is that red瀞s being a color consists in its having the
property of being a color (or some other property or combination of properties) as a
constituent.  But constituent ontologists don瀞t say this.  If any thing瀞s having any
character consisted in its having a certain property as a constituent, all properties
would be made up of further properties.  The property of being red would be made
up of such properties as being a color, which would in turn be made up of yet
further properties; and so it would go on.  And the character of every property would
be grounded in the character of some other property.  There would be no ultimate
metaphysical ground of the book瀞s being red:  it would consist in something else,
which in turn would consist in something further, and so on without end, like a
building with no lowest floor.  (Relationalists, by contrast, can happily say that every
property has other properties, generating an endless chain in which each link
exemplifes the next, because they don瀞t say that a thing瀞s character is grounded in
its properties.)
Constituent ontologists say that the property of being red has no properties as
constituents, and thus no ontological structure.12  Either there are no 惇higher-order敦
properties that a property can have, or else such properties are not in their
instances, and properties have properties in a different way from that in which
concrete particulars have them.  Yet every property has a character.  It follows that
some things have a character without having properties as parts.  And because
different such things have different characters, their character cannot consist in their
lacking such parts either.  (The character of a substratum might consist in its having
no properties as parts, but this is a special case.)  So a thing瀞s character is not
always grounded in its ontological structure, or presumably in anything else.  Some
12Armstrong appears to say that complex properties have their character by virtue
of being composed of simpler properties, and thus resemble each other by having
common constituents (1989: 106).  Simple properties, though, have brute character.
(He says they never resemble each other, even though any two of them are both
properties, both simple, and more like each other than like a dog.  This is an odd
use of the word 酉resemble瀞.)
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character is 惇brute敦.
But then why suppose that concrete particulars have properties as parts?  Why
isn瀞t their character brute?  You might say that some things must have a brute
character because not everything can have its character derivatively (Loux 2006:
207f.).  If my book has its color by having redness as a part, it derives or 惇borrows敦
its character from that property.  And not everything can borrow its character.
Borrowing has to come to an end somewhere.  Some things must have a character
in their own right, nonderivatively.  But even if this explains why not all things have
properties as parts, it does nothing to explain why some do.  Nor does it tell us
which do and which don瀞t, or why.
Not only does the constituent ontology give no account of the character of
properties, but it appears unable to account for the entire character even of
concrete particulars.  Their having properties as constituents is normally taken to
imply that every property is a constituent of something:  properties are in their
instances, and every property has to be somewhere (Armstrong 1997: 38, Loux
2006: 233-39).  This will hold for relations as well:  if the book瀞s being red is
grounded in its having as a constituent the property of being red, then the book瀞s
resting on the desk must be grounded in something瀞s having as a constituent the
relation of resting on.  At least this will be so for external relations, the holding of
which is not grounded in the properties of the relata.
This something--the thing of which the resting-on relation is a constituent--
cannot be either the book or the desk.  Its being a constituent of the desk could only
account for some of the desk瀞s parts resting on others--its top resting on its legs, for
instance (and likewise for the book).  The something has to include both book and
desk, taking up the whole of the book and the desk but not their surroundings:  not
the carpet beneath the desk or the sandwich on top of the book.  But it won瀞t be
composed only of the book and the desk either, as such a thing would not have the
resting-on relation as a constituent (though it might have that relation as a part, if it瀞s
a constituent of the desk).  We need an object having the book, the desk, and the
resting-on relation as constituents--a concrete particular like the book and the desk.
This suggests an analog of principle 4:
4*.  Concrete particular x bears an external relation to concrete particular y iff (and
because) there is a concrete particular having as constituents x, y, and the
relation.
(Similar principles would hold for relations of more than two places.)
But the existence of a 惇relational complex敦13 having as constituents the book,
the desk, and the resting-on relation cannot make it the case that the book rests on
13I take the term 酉complex瀞 from Price (1998: 24).
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the desk:  it could just as easily make it the case that the desk rests on the book.  It
may be that the book rests on the desk because the book bears the resting-on
relation to the desk.  But this cannot consist in the resting-on relation瀞s being a
constituent of anything.  The mere existence of something made up of the book, the
desk, and the resting-on relation cannot determine whether the book is on the desk
or the desk on the book.
Someone might say (as Armstrong does, 1997: 121) that the book瀞s resting on
the desk is grounded in one sort of object composed of the book, the desk, and the
resting-on relation, whereas the desk瀞s resting on the book (if I were to rearrange
my office furniture) would be grounded in a different sort of object composed of the
same three entities arranged differently.  By analogy, we could glue a red Lego
brick to a blue one either with red on top and blue underneath or vice versa.  If this
would create an object composed of the two bricks and the glue, it would create a
qualitatively different object depending on how we arranged them.  That looks like
the only way for the constituent ontology to account for things瀞 relational character.
But this works badly with relations that are neither symmetric (like touching) nor
asymmetric (like resting on).  Suppose Alex loves Leo.  The proposal is that this is
because there is a concrete particular composed of Alex, Leo, and the loving
relation, arranged, so to speak, in that order.  Were those things arranged
otherwise, they would compose a different particular that would make it the case
that Leo loves Alex.  Well, suppose Leo loves Alex too, so that the things are also
arranged in this other way.  Then there are two objects--two concrete particulars--
composed of Alex, Leo, and the loving relation.  One, the 惇Alex-to-Leo complex敦,
accounts for Alex瀞s loving Leo; the other, the 惇Leo-to-Alex complex敦, accounts for
Leo瀞s loving Alex.  They differ in that their constituents are differently arranged.
(Here the analogy fails:  if bricks are arranged with red above and blue below, they
cannot at the same time have blue above and red below.)
But this looks incoherent.  The two complexes would be composed of the same
three constituents, and since each person loves the other, the constituents would
be arranged both Alex-to-Leo and Leo-to-Alex.  If two objects are composed of the
same parts, and those parts are arranged in the same way, nothing about the way
the parts are arranged can make the objects qualitatively different.  Of course, we
know what it is for Alex to love Leo, what it is for Leo to love Alex, and how these
propositions differ.  But that does nothing to account for the difference between the
Alex-to-Leo and Leo-to-Alex complexes.
Someone might say that the Alex-to-Leo complex exists because Alex loves
Leo, whereas the Leo-to-Alex complex exists because Leo loves Alex.  Were Alex
to stop loving Leo, there would cease to be an Alex-to-Leo complex, though a Leo-
to-Alex complex may remain.  Despite the fact that they have the same parts
arranged in the same way, the two complexes differ by having different
metaphysical grounds.  But this gets the grounding the wrong way round:  the
constituent ontology says that Alex loves Leo because there is an Alex-to-Leo
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complex, not vice versa.
Now there are philosophers--惇constitutionalists敦--who think that concrete
particulars can and do compose qualitatively different objects at once:  my atoms,
for instance, now compose both a person who is thinking about philosophy and an
organism or 惇body敦 that is not.  Both have the same parts, arranged in the same
way.  What makes them different is not the way their parts are arranged, but
something else.  If this is so, it may also be possible for concrete particulars and
relations arranged in the same way to compose qualitatively different objects.  But
others find this aspect of constitutionalism deeply mysterious, and its advocates
have done nothing to dispel the apparent mystery (see Bennett 2004, Olson 2001).
Apparently the constituent ontology can account for the character of relational
complexes (and the relational character of things generally) only by embracing the
same mystery.
I have argued that the relational ontology offers no good account of what gives
ordinary objects their character, undermining the main reason for accepting it.
(There may, of course, be other such reasons I haven瀞t considered.)  I turn now to
reasons to think the view is false.  They arise even if the worries I have been
considering can be answered.  The problems have to do with objects that are more
惇abstract敦 than ordinary concrete particulars in that they have fewer properties as
constituents.  We might call them quasi-abstract objects.  (酉Quasi-abstract things瀞 or
酉entities瀞 would be an equally good name:  I don瀞t mean anything special by
酉object瀞.)
Consider the thing composed of all my constituents except my physical
properties:  shape, size, mass, temperature, atomic structure, and so on.  (I ask in
§9 whether there has to be such a thing.)  According to the constituent ontology
(principle 4), it will lack any physical properties.  It will be a wholly nonphysical or
immaterial thing.  Yet all my mental properties will be constituents of it, making it (by
4 again) psychologically indistiguishable from me.  It will be an immaterial mind.
This is not quite Cartesian dualism, as it doesn瀞t imply that all thinking beings
are immaterial or that physical and mental properties are incompatible.  In a way it
is less mysterious than Cartesian dualism, since it allows that mental phenomena
might arise out of physical ones.  But in another way it瀞s more mysterious:  it implies
that even if all mental phenomena have a physical basis, some of their subjects--
some conscious, thinking beings--are wholly immaterial.  It would mean that there
are both material and immaterial human thinkers, and that for every human being
there is one of each.  It is an absurd amalgam of dualism and materialism.
The problem would not arise in this form if all mental properties were physical
properties.  But it would arise in another form:  consider the thing composed of all
my constituents except my nonmental properties.  It will have only those of my
physical properties that are also mental properties.  Since mass, shape, and color
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will not be mental properties even if some physical properties are, it would be a
massless, shapeless, colorless mind.
Maybe we should expect a thing composed of all my constituents except my
physical properties to be a strange sort of object.  But the constituent ontology
would make any object composed of material things equally strange.  Consider the
thing composed of my atoms:  the thing such that each of my current atoms is now a
part of it, and every part of it now shares a part with one or more of those atoms.
Call it O.  O may have parts that are not atoms.  The negative charge that is a
constituent of each of my atoms瀞 electrons might be one.  My liver might be another,
since each of its parts would overlap one or more of my atoms.  (Any atom that is a
part of my liver shares a part with it, since each is a part of itself.)  But any part of O
other than an atom would have to be either a part of one of O瀞s atoms or else
composed of parts distributed across several of those atoms.
If O瀞s properties are parts of it, then each of them must also share a part with one
or more of O瀞s atoms.  There are two cases.  First, a property might be a part of one
or more of O瀞s individual atoms.  Presumably any property that is a part of an atom
is a constituent of it, and thus a property it exemplifies.  So any property of O瀞s that
is a part of one or more of its atoms will be a property it shares with those atoms.
But O will have many properties that it doesn瀞t share with any of its atoms:  its
human shape and size, for instance, its atomic structure or chemical makeup, and
its having a solid surface.
Alternatively, a property might, like my liver, be composed of parts distributed
across several of O瀞s atoms without itself being a part of any of them.  But O瀞s shape
could not be like this either.  A small plaster figurine could have the same shape.
So could a thing composed of the figurine瀞s atoms.  Its shape, like O瀞s, would have
to be composed of parts of its individual atoms.  But its shape would have far fewer
parts than O瀞s shape has, or at any rate fewer atom-sized parts.  So they could not
be the same shape (or qualitatively identical shape tropes).
It appears, then, that O瀞s shape could be neither a part of one of its atoms nor
composed of parts distributed across several of its atoms.  But because O is
composed of atoms, every part of it must be either an atom, a part of an atom, or
composed of things that are parts of atoms.  It follows that O瀞s shape cannot be a
part of it.  Yet the constituent ontology requires a thing瀞s shape to be a part of it.  We
can only conclude that O has no shape.
Likewise, O瀞s size or volume cannot be a part of any atom.  Nor could it be
composed of parts of O瀞s atoms.  If it were, those parts would presumably be the
atoms瀞 sizes:  how could a size be composed of anything other than sizes?  And if
the sizes of each of O瀞s atoms composed a size, it would be the sum of those sizes.
But O瀞s size is far greater than the sum of the sizes of its atoms, since most of its
volume consists of the empty space between the atoms.  It follows that O cannot
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have any size property as a part.  If properties are parts, O can have no size.
Or consider O瀞s atomic structure.  It will have to include relations among O瀞s
atoms.  But those relations cannot be either parts of individual atoms or composed
of such parts.  Because O is composed of atoms, such relations cannot be parts of
it, and thus on the constituent ontology it cannot have an atomic structure.  But how
could a thing composed of close-knit atoms have no atomic structure?
The constituent ontology appears to imply that the object composed of my atoms
could have no shape or size or atomic structure.  And this goes for all things
composed of atoms.  But ordinary material things have a shape, size, and atomic
structure.  It follows that ordinary material things--human beings, stones, pieces of
furniture--are not composed of atoms.  They may have atoms among their parts, but
they need other parts as well, which don瀞t overlap their atoms.  They have to be
composed of atoms together with certain properties (and probably relations).  It is
metaphysically impossible for an ordinary material thing to be made up entirely of
smaller material things:  atoms, bricks, pieces of yarn, or what have you.
You could still make a material thing out of bricks in the sense that you would
not literally need to 惇add敦 the properties to the bricks in order to construct one.  All
you would have to do is arrange bricks, and that action would generate the
necessary further ingredients.  But the resulting material thing would not be made
up entirely of bricks.
This makes the nature of objects composed of material things mysterious.  The
thing composed of my atoms could not be a person or a human being or even a
material thing.  It would have no shape or size or atomic structure.  What character it
would have is anyone瀞s guess.
This is trouble.  For one thing, it puts the mystery in the wrong place:  it makes
what ought to be familiar things mysterious, and what ought to be mysterious things
familiar and ordinary.  We expect familiar things to be made up of atoms.  If
anything is mysterious, it ought to be something were made up partly of concrete
and partly of abstract entities--a compound of certain atoms and the number 42,
say.  Yet the constituent ontology implies that things made up partly of atoms and
partly of properties and relations are the ordinary and familiar ones, and the weird
things are those made of atoms.
For another, it瀞s incompatible with the usual statement of the constituent
ontology.  Constituentists say that ordinary objects are composed entirely of atoms,
as well as being entirely composed, on another level, of properties and relations.  It
now appears that this cannot be right.  At best familiar objects could be composed
of atoms together with properties and relations, much as a desk is composed of
wooden pieces together with metal ones.
But the real trouble is that it is impossible for a thing made up entirely of things
with shape and size to lack any shape and size of its own.  How could things that
individually take up space add up to something that takes up no space?  Consider
a thing composed of bricks.  It will not typically have the shape of any of the bricks.
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Nor could it have one composed of the shapes or other parts of the individual
bricks, for whatever shape it has could be shared with an object having a
completely different composition.  If its shape would have to be a part of it, then it
simply cannot have a shape.  Putting bricks together might produce something with
a shape--a thing composed of bricks together with a shape and perhaps other
properties--but the thing composed of the bricks would have none.  For that matter,
a thing composed of the bricks and a certain shape would apparently have shape
but no size, whereas a thing composed of the bricks and a certain size would have
size but no shape.   If ordinary things had properties as parts, there would be
impossible objects.
Can the problem be solved?  Someone might say that quasi-abstract objects
have a brute character not determined by their constituents.  So the object
composed of all my parts except my physical properties, though it has no physical
properties as constituents, nevertheless has a physical character.  Likewise, the
thing now composed of my atoms is physically just like me, even though my shape,
size, and atomic structure are not constituents of it.  So there are no impossible
objects.  If this appears to contradict the central claim of the constituent ontology,
namely that the character of a concrete particular consists in its constituent
properties, we could make it consistent by denying that quasi-abstract objects are
concrete particulars.
But this would be like saying that if our theory of dogs doesn瀞t apply to terriers,
that only shows that terriers aren瀞t dogs.  A thing composed of bricks is a paradigm
case of a concrete particular, just as a terrier is of a paradigm case of a dog.  How
could a thing made of bricks not be concrete?  How could it not be a particular?
You might say that concrete particulars are those things whose constituent
properties account for their character:  those satisfying principles 1-5.  But that
would make the constituent ontology into the harmless tautology that those things
with properties as constituents have properties as constituents.  It would remain an
open question whether there are any such things.  If things composed of atoms,
whether concrete particulars or not, have a brute character not fixed by their
constituents, why not say that all things do?
Or one might deny the existence of quasi-abstract objects.14  My argument from
the constituent ontology to substance dualism assumed that there was something
composed of all my parts except my physical properties.  And my argument that
objects composed of atoms could have no shape or size assumed that my atoms
compose something.  But why assume this?  Maybe there is nothing composed of
14Simply denying that they can exist independently of ordinary, 惇complete敦 objects
is no help.
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all my parts except my physical properties, and nothing composed of my atoms, or
of any other atoms.  Maybe none of the problematic entities exist.  There would then
be no problem of quasi-abstract objects.  This would of course mean that
composition is restricted rather than universal:  some things compose something
bigger and others don瀞t.  But unrestricted composition is controversial, and there is
no reason why constituent ontologists must accept it (even if many do, e.g.
Armstrong 1997: 13).
If quasi-abstract objects were always arbitrary and gerrymandered, so that we
had no reason to believe in their existence apart from the principle of unrestricted
composition, this would be a promising thought.  Unless I believe that any things
whatever must compose something, it瀞s reasonable for me to doubt whether there
is anything composed of Peru, the Thirty Years War, and the key of B flat.
Challenged to say why those things don瀞t compose anything, I should be within my
rights to reply, 惇Why suppose that they do?敦
But there is nothing arbitrary about a thing composed of my atoms.  It seems
possible for atoms to compose something, even if not all things do, or even all
atoms.  If composition is not universal, it would be surprising if there were a thing
composed of Peru, the Thirty Years War, and the key of B flat.  It would not be
surprising if there were things composed of atoms.  In fact it would be surprising if
there were no such things.  If any things ever compose anything, surely certain
atoms do.
It doesn瀞t help that the constituent ontology requires an otherwise generous
ontology of composite objects.  Recall that whenever one concrete particular
stands in an external relation to another, there must be a further concrete particular
composed of those things together with the relation--two of them if the relation is
nonsymmetric and each bears it to the other.  Because my left foot is gravitationally
attracted to Mars, there must be something composed of those two things together
with the attraction relation, and perhaps also a second such object to account for
my foot瀞s attracting Mars.  That makes a lot of objects besides the familiar ones that
we have names for.  Combining this with the claim that atoms can never compose
anything looks unprincipled at best.
You may think the problems arise from conflating two different senses of
parthood.  Constitutive parthood and composition are one thing; mereological
parthood and composition are something else.  They are not only different, but
independent, in that a thing can be a constitutive part of something without being a
mereological part, or a mereological part without being a constitutive part.  So I am
mereologically composed of certain atoms:  each atom is a mereological part of me,
and every mereological part of me shares a mereological part with one or more of
those atoms.  But my atoms are not constituents of me.  I am not constitutively
composed of atoms, but rather of properties (set aside relations and substrata):
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each of my properties is a constituent of me, and every constituent of me shares a
constituent with one or more of those properties.  And a thing瀞s being
mereologically composed of atoms is perfectly compatible with its being
constitutively composed of properties that share no parts with those atoms.  The
idea is that there is nothing 惇quasi-abstract敦 or otherwise problematic about objects
mereologically composed of atoms:  they are ordinary things, with just the shape,
size, and atomic structure we should expect.
Now if constituents are parts of any sort, there will be a more general notion
encompassing both constitutive and mereological parthood, and a similarly broad
notion of composition.  We might call them PARTHOOD and COMPOSITION, and define
them like this (where 酉part瀞 means 酉mereological part瀞):
x is a PART of y =df x is a part or a constituent of y.
The xs COMPOSE y =df each of the xs is a PART of y, and every PART of y shares a
PART with one or more of the xs.
And the problem of quasi-abstract objects can be restated using these generic
notions.  Consider the object now COMPOSED of my atoms.  By the definition of
COMPOSITION, every PART of it that is not an atom must be either a PART of an atom or
COMPOSED of PARTS of several atoms.  Yet that object瀞s shape and size could be
neither PARTS of any individual atom nor COMPOSED of PARTS of several atoms.  So
they could not be PARTS of the object, and therefore not constituents of it.  It could
have neither shape nor size, which is impossible.
But constituent ontologists will turn this reasoning on its head.15  They will deny
that my atoms COMPOSE anything.  Otherwise (by the definition of COMPOSITION)
everything that was either a part or a constituent of such a thing would have to
share a part or constituent with one or more of the atoms.  That would rule out its
having a size or a shape, for the reason just given.  Yet it would have to have a size
and shape.  It follows that my atoms cannot COMPOSE anything.  At most the atoms
together with my size and shape could COMPOSE something.  Presumably atoms
could never COMPOSE anything (except in the degenerate case where there is only
one atom that COMPOSES itself).  Yet atoms could still compose something.  In fact the
proposal is compatible with universal composition, though not of course with
universal COMPOSITION.  But no one ever endorsed universal COMPOSITION.
The proposal may seem confusing.  A thing瀞s being a part of something (in the
mereological sense) entails its being a PART of it; so it may appear that things瀞
composing something entails their COMPOSING it.  But the proposal denies this.  It
says that my atoms compose a thing by being its parts (at a certain level of
decomposition).  And they are also PARTS of it.  Yet they do not COMPOSE that thing.
This is because not all its PARTS share a PART with one or more of the atoms.
Specifically, its shape and size are PARTS of it--constituents--but do not share a PART
15I thank Chad Carmichael for helping me to see this.
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with any of the atoms.
This looks like the best way for constituent ontologists to respond to the problem
of quasi-abstract objects.  Remember, though, that mereological parthood is not a
special technical concept invented by metaphysicians.  It瀞s just ordinary,
unqualified parthood.  惇Mereological敦 parts are simply parts.  (As we saw earlier,
this need not entail conformity with all the principles of classical mereology.)  So the
proposal amounts to denying that a thing瀞s constituents are parts of it.  Constituency
is not parthood, but only something like it.  Ordinary objects are 惇made up敦 of
properties, but not in the sense of having them as parts.
Suppose, then, that constituents are not parts.  Because this is an important
departure from the views we have considered so far, we had better call it the
modified constituent ontology.
The proposal will have to go beyond denying that constituency is a sort of
parthood.  Being a constituent of something has to rule out its being a part of it.
Constituency and parthood must be incompatible.  This is for at least two reasons.
First, suppose a constituent of something could be a part of it.  Suppose my size
were a part of me (as well as a constituent).  Then I could not be composed of
atoms, but at best of atoms together with a size property.  But my atoms would still
compose something--mereologically compose, that is--or at least they would if
atoms can ever compose something.  We might once again call that the thing they
would compose O.  What would O be like?  Seeing as it would be composed
entirely of things with a size, it too would have to have a size:  the same as mine.
But that size, once again, could not be a part of it, as it would not be composed of
parts distributed across O瀞s atoms.  So there would be two objects with the same
size, and this size would be a part of one of them (me) but not of the other (O--
though it would be a constituent of O).  Yet no difference in our properties would
account for the difference in how we relate to our sizes, violating the claim that a
thing瀞s character consists in its properties (principle 2).
Second, if a thing瀞s constituents could be parts of it but needn瀞t be, we should
expect some of things瀞 properties to be parts of them and some not to be.  (It would
be surprising if properties could be parts of their instances, but they never are.)  But
which?  In what circumstances would a property of a thing be a part of it?  Without
some answer to this question, however incomplete, there will be no solution to the
problem of quasi-abstract objects.  And it瀞s hard to see what the answer might be.
These problems would not arise if constituency ruled out parthood.  But this
avoids the trouble only by lapsing into obscurity.  That a thing stands to its
properties in a way at least analogous to that of whole to part was the central claim
of the constituent ontology.  Even if constituents aren瀞t parts exactly, they were
supposed to be like parts.  If constituency is actually incompatible with parthood,
what remains of this claim?
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The point becomes more acute when we consider the thing composed of my
atoms together with my properties.  Call it O*.  Given that constituency rules out
parthood, O* will not have any of my properties:  since those properties are parts of
it, they cannot be constituents, which (by principle 4) rules out its exemplifying
them.  And things sharing no properties are utterly dissimilar.  It will probably not
even count as a concrete particular.  This will be due entirely to the difference
between constituency and parthood--between my properties瀞 being constituents of
me rather than parts, and parts of O* rather than constituents.  That makes
constituency and parthood very different relations.
Someone might deny that there is anything composed of my atoms together with
my properties, rejecting the existence of O*.  This would be a restriction on
mereological composition.  Suitably generalized, it would rule out properties瀞 being
parts of any ordinary object--even properties the object doesn瀞t exemplify.  Not only
are a thing瀞s constituents never parts of it, but no properties could be, again
reinforcing the difference between constituency and parthood.
The urgent question at this point is whether the modified constituent ontology is
any different from the relational ontology.  How does constituency differ from the
惇abstract and bloodless敦 relation that properties bear to their instances according to
relationalism?  What could it mean to say that dogs are composed of properties if
no property is anything like a part of a dog?  What is there in the view for
relationalists to object to?
There is still the claim that a thing瀞s properties ground or explain its character
(with the exceptions noted in §§4 and 5).  This was supposed to rule out things瀞
relating to their properties in the abstract way of the relational ontology:  a thing瀞s
properties have to be constituents of it.  But what is it to be a constituent?  The
original answer was that a thing瀞s constituents are in it--built into its structure.  And
to be in a thing was to be a sort of part of it, or something like a part.  Though that
leaves many questions unanswered, it would clearly rule out the relational
ontology.  It瀞s no help, though, if properties are not like parts.  Relationalists are
unlikely to quarrel with the claim that properties are in their instances in a sense
that is indefinable and unrelated to parthood.
Until we瀞re told more about the modified constituent ontology, it瀞s hard to know
what to make of it.16
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